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Over the past couple of years, 
the widening U.S. trade deficit and 
rising oil prices became front page 
news in discussions of U.S. economic 
performance.  The longer-term impact 
of globalization on our labor markets 
and economic well-being became a 
discussion topic at cocktail parties and 
around dinner tables.   The feeling 
that globalization was leading to the 
loss of U.S. jobs made some people 
even question whether free trade was 
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Exchange Rates, and Free Trade” was the 
topic of our fourth annual Philadelphia Fed 
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sponsored by the Bank’s Research Department, brought 
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the global economy.  Our hope is that the 2004 Policy 
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as positive for the U.S. economy as 
economists know it to be.  As world 
economies become more integrated, 
topics such as the macroeconomic 
effects of outsourcing, exchange rate 
policies and the flow of financial capi-
tal, and free trade and the cross-border 
flow of goods and services are garner-
ing increased attention from policy-
makers and researchers.  How best to 
seize the opportunities and meet the 
challenges of the global economy was 
the focus of the 2004 Philadelphia Fed 
Policy Forum.
Anthony M. Santomero, presi-
dent of the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Philadelphia, began the day discussing 
the breadth and depth of the global 
economy’s influence. The international 
marketplace is widening geographical-
ly, and the U.S.’s relationships with its 
traditional trading partners in North 
America and Europe, with Japan, and 
with the emerging markets of Asia are 
evolving. 
In Santomero’s view, developments 
in the global economy are transform-
ing the basic structure of the economy, 
the issues policymakers need to ad-
dress, and the questions researchers are 
studying.  The revolution in informa-
tion technology and the emergence of 
new market economies are opening up 
opportunities to reallocate production 
and distribution around the globe. 
Yet, so far, the potential effects of 
this outsourcing on the U.S. econ-
omy have been difficult to quantify. 
Similarly, there is still much to learn 
about the distribution of the costs and 
benefits of free trade. An examination 
of the sharp decline in the value of the 
dollar during the mid-1980s suggests 
that a substantial relative price change 
causes an expansion or contraction of 
economic activity in well-established 
sectors but does not open up brand 
new areas of international trade. 
Declining trade barriers, however, 
bring more fundamental change to 
the economies affected.  For example, 
as Timothy Kehoe discussed later in 
the day, the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) led to an 
increase in trade in goods and ser-
vices that were traded only in limited 
quantities previously and acceler-
ated the transfer of new technologies 
across borders. Santomero conjectures 
that one possible explanation for the 
difference in effects is that a change 
in tariffs is perceived as being more 
permanent than a change in exchange 
rates; hence, it elicits a larger response.  
He also posits another possible expla-
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affect relative prices across a broader 
array of goods and services and so 
evoke smaller adjustments across that 
broad array, while changes in tariffs 
affect a smaller number of goods and 
services and so have narrower but 
larger effects.  
While opening up free trade 
brings participants an improved stan-
dard of living, it also creates disloca-
tions and imposes cost on individual 
sectors within nations. As Santomero 
points out, free trade is beneficial 
provided the people and firms who 
gain from it are able to compensate the 
losers.  Policymakers need to grapple 
with the political problem of how to 
redistribute the benefits of free trade 
in order to build and maintain support 
for free-trade policy. Countries are 
approaching free trade along various 
paths.  Some are pursuing global trade 
arrangements, others are pursuing 
free trade areas, and some are pursu-
ing bilateral trade agreements. In 
Santomero’s view, the success of each 
of these strategies in building the 
necessary support for free trade is an 
open question.  
OUTSOURCING1
The Policy Forum’s first session 
considered the issue of outsourcing. 
Was it a reason for employment’s slow 
recovery in this expansion? What has 
it meant for the industrial sector? And 
what determines whether a firm will 
choose to outsource its operations?
Labor markets have been weaker 
for longer in this recovery than in any 
of the other postwar recoveries, even 
the one in 1991, which has been called 
the jobless recovery.  The 1990 and 
2001 recessions were about the same 
length – eight months – but it took 
almost four years for U.S. 
employment to recover back 
to the level of its previous 
peak in March 2001. During 
the 1991 recovery, it took 
about two and a half years.
Cathy Minehan, presi-
dent of the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Boston, elaborated 
on the behavior of labor 
markets during this business 
cycle.  In her view, foreign 
outsourcing has not played 
a major role in the relatively 
slow rate of job growth 
during this recovery.  The 
U.S. economy in the third 
quarter of 2004 looked quite healthy, 
growing at a sustainable pace, with the 
unemployment rate trending down, 
inflation well contained, and produc-
tivity growth strong. Still, sluggish job 
growth had been a concern during the 
recovery.  Labor-force growth had out-
paced job growth during and after the 
recession and opened an employment 
gap.  Unemployment had been longer 
in duration than typical, and Mine-
han posited that this was because job 
losses during the recession had been 
of a more permanent than temporary 
nature.  Highly educated middle-aged 
workers lost jobs this time, but the less 
educated, younger workers made up 
more of the long-term unemployed.  
Also unique to this recovery is that 
labor-force participation continued to 
decline as the recovery unfolded.  
Minehan presented a range of 
estimates of how much job growth 
would be needed to close the gap 
between actual and full employment. 
These estimates depend on what is 
assumed about population growth, the 
labor-force participation rate, and the 
noninflationary unemployment rate. 
To meet demographic growth in the 
labor force, which includes population 
growth and changing patterns of work 
and aging, Minehan estimates the 
economy needs to add about 120,000 
jobs per month. If labor force participa-
tion continues on the low side, then 
the economy needs to create fewer jobs 
to absorb labor supply. But if labor-
force participation reverts to its more 
normal level, the economy would need 
to add more workers. Also, the lower 
one believes unemployment can go 
without inflation becoming a problem, 
the more jobs can be created.  Depend-
ing on the assumptions about labor-
force participation and the natural rate 
of unemployment, Minehan estimates 
that somewhere between 125,000 and 
225,000 jobs per month would have 
to be created to absorb the increase in 
labor supply.  
Minehan evaluated two factors 
that the media have often mentioned 
 1 Many of the presentations reviewed 
here are available on our web site at www.
philadelphiafed.org/econ/conf/ policyforum2004.
html.
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Robert Lawrence of Harvard 
University extended the discussion 
of the relatively weak employment 
growth the U.S. experienced during 
the recovery.  The media have focused 
on the role of international trade, 
particularly with China and India, and 
the effects of outsourcing on the U.S. 
economy were discussed during the re-
cent presidential campaign. Lawrence 
described some of his recent research 
with Martin Baily of the Institute for 
International Economics that attempts 
to quantify the role of trade on the 
employment losses between 2000 and 
2003. Like Minehan, he pointed out 
the sharp drop in manufacturing em-
ployment during the recent recession. 
In fact, while the share of employ-
ment in manufacturing declined 
throughout the 1990s, the number of 
workers employed in manufacturing 
didn’t begin to decline until 2001, the 
beginning of the recession. In his view, 
one cannot simply attribute this to 
as factors for the recent unusually slow 
job growth. First, the loss in manufac-
turing jobs has continued, and it has 
become steeper in recent years. But in 
Minehan’s view, while this is part of 
the recent story, it cannot fully explain 
sluggish job growth, since the economy 
has been losing manufacturing jobs 
for most of the last 30 years. Second, 
foreign outsourcing has expanded. Not 
only goods-producing industries but 
also service-producing industries have 
begun to outsource. But, again, this 
cannot be the full explanation. While 
U.S. firms are outsourcing to India and 
China, Minehan points out that those 
countries appear to be buying more 
services from the U.S. than the U.S. is 
from them, and this creates an offset in 
terms of jobs. The fact that U.S. firms 
do not point to imports or outsoucing 
as the main cause of extended layoffs 
is taken by Minehan 
as evidence against the 
outsourcing explanation 
of slow job growth.  
Then what is the ex-
planation? Why are U.S. 
firms demanding less 
labor? Partly, this may be 
due to structural change 
as the economy shifts its 
mix of products and ser-
vices; partly it might be 
a reaction to increasing 
labor costs, especially the 
cost of benefits; partly it 
might be firms’ response 
to higher uncertainty, 
perhaps over the staying 
power of the recovery 
because of high oil prices 
and geopolitical concerns; and perhaps 
it’s because firms are driven to become 
ever more productive. Minehan con-
cludes that the latter two factors – un-
certainty and the drive for increased 
productivity – might be the best 
explanations of the sluggish job growth 
that characterized this recovery.
stronger productivity growth because 
productivity growth was rapid not only 
in manufacturing but also in other sec-
tors, which experienced fewer losses.  
Looking deeper at the data shows that 
managers and production workers suf-
fered the largest job losses, but many of 
those managers were in the manufac-
turing sector.  Another factor during 
this recovery that Lawrence highlight-
ed was the abnormally slow recovery 
in investment, which he feels is an im-
portant part of the story.  Indeed, the 
largest manufacturing employment de-
cline was in computers and electronic 
products, which lost about 30 percent 
of its jobs. In effect, it was the capital 
goods part of the manufacturing sector 
that experienced the highest job losses. 
In addition, exports during this cycle 
were quite a bit weaker than they were 
over other cycles, while imports were 
somewhat weaker. Since manufactur-
ing productivity growth was much 
higher over the 2000-2003 period than 
either manufacturing export or import 
growth, jobs attributable to exports 
declined over this period, as did jobs 
embodied in imports.2   
But devising reliable measures to 
determine trade’s impact on employ-
ment is not easy.  Lawrence and Baily 
take an input-output approach to 
determine the sectors in which exports 
create jobs and the sectors in which 
imports subtract from jobs in the sense 
that jobs in those sectors would have 
been higher had we produced those 
imports domestically rather than buy-
Robert Lawrence
Devising reliable measures to determine 
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productivity growth rose 15.2 percent, 
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ing them from abroad.  Since total out-
put equals production for domestic use 
plus exports minus imports, after jobs 
attributable to exports and imports 
are determined, jobs attributable to 
domestic use can be calculated as the 
residual.  The results of their analy-
sis suggest that weak U.S. domestic 
demand and trade both contributed to 
the loss in employment from 2000 to 
2003, but that domestic demand had 
a larger effect than trade. Moreover, 
most of the job losses due to trade were 
due to weak exports and not to in-
creased imports. Merchandise imports 
as a share of goods GDP were stable, 
31.8 percent in 2000 and 31.4 percent 
in 2003, while merchandise exports 
as a share of goods GDP fell from 22.7 
percent in 2000 to 20.1 percent in 
2003. Based on data available as of De-
cember 2004, Lawrence and Baily esti-
mate that of the 2.85 million jobs lost 
between 2000 and 2003, 2.54 million 
were due to weak domestic demand, 
0.74 million were due to weak exports, 
and imports actually contributed 0.43 
million jobs.  Lawrence concludes that 
the job losses during the recession and 
first part of the recovery were “made 
in America.” His analysis also reveals 
that the decline in U.S. exports is a 
market-share story rather than a weak-
foreign-demand story.  The U.S. lost 
competitiveness against other suppliers 
to the world market.  If the U.S. had 
held its share in world markets, exports 
would have risen by 23.5 percent rath-
er than declined.  The lagged effects 
of the rise in the value of the dollar in 
the late 1990s played an important role 
in limiting U.S. exports as well.
Finally, Lawrence turned his focus 
to the future of manufacturing employ-
ment.  Here there are two countervail-
ing effects. If the U.S. closes the trade 
deficit by 2015, this will create jobs 
as U.S. exports increase and imports 
decrease. But if at the same time pro-
ductivity growth in manufacturing sta-
bilizes at its average 3.9 percent pace 
seen over the past decade, then net 
employment creation will be much less.   
Lawrence concluded that contrary to 
the discussion in the popular press, 
trade was not a large part of the story 
of the employment losses during the 
recession and it isn’t likely to be a large 
part of the manufacturing employment 
story of the future.
While the session’s first two 
speakers concentrated on the mac-
roeconomic effects of trade and 
outsourcing, the next speaker, Gene 
Grossman of Princeton University, 
refocused the discussion, taking a 
microeconomics perspective on how 
multinational firms decide to organize 
their production activities.  Grossman 
explained that trade theory is con-
cerned with the allocation of resources 
over the longer run rather than the 
shorter-run dynamics discussed by 
our first two speakers.  He began by 
explaining the difference between 
“outsourcing” and “offshoring,” terms 
that are often used synonymously in 
popular discussions but that trade 
economists view as distinct.  Outsourc-
ing pertains to how a firm chooses to 
organize itself. Does the firm perform 
an activity in-house, or does it subcon-
tract the activity to another producer? 
A decision to outsource is a decision to 
go outside the boundaries of the firm. 
Offshoring pertains to the location of 
an activity, either at home or abroad.  
A firm that subcontracts, say, its call 
center, to another firm that sets up the 
center in India, would be offshoring 
and outsourcing.  
Outsourcing has several distinc-
tive features.  The types of goods that 
are traded in outsourcing relationships 
are often customized for a particular 
user. This is different from the types 
of products that trade theory usually 
considers, which are homogeneous 
goods that can be bought in multiple 
markets.  This customization requires 
relationship-specific investments, 
which enhance the value of the rela-
tionship.  Outsourcing also requires 
contracts to govern the relationship.  
Offshoring also has distinctive fea-
tures. One aspect is the cost of trans-
portation and communication.  These 
fixed costs can create complementa-
rities between offshoring activities.  
Once one activity is moved offshore, it 
is cheaper to offshore another activity. 
This can lead to an increase in the vol-
ume of activity that is moved offshore. 
Thus, there’s a positive feedback.  
Once a firm has paid the fixed costs 
of moving an activity offshore, say, 
to a low-wage country, the firm’s unit 
costs of production will be lower and it 
will gain sales.  But the increased sales 
give the firm the incentive to lower its 
unit costs in other ways, so the firm 
may consider paying the fixed costs 
to move another production activity 
offshore to achieve further reductions 
in unit costs. Also, if transportation 
costs are high, firms might move 
several parts of the production process 
offshore at the same time to economize 
on these costs. Thus, the economy can 
go from exhibiting a small amount of 
offshoring to exhibiting a large amount 
in a short period of time. Hence, the 
fact that U.S. firms aren’t offshoring 
that much production yet does not 
imply that they won’t in the future. 
Another aspect of offshoring is that it 
It is often the largest and most productive ﬁrms 
that ﬁnd it cost effective to move production 
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is often the largest and most produc-
tive firms that find it cost effective to 
move production offshore, since these 
firms are better able to bear the fixed 
costs needed to obtain savings on the 
variable costs of production and to 
bear the increased cost of monitoring 
performance across a longer distance.
The new literature on trade is 
drawing on the theory of the firm 
to address some of the interesting 
questions regarding outsourcing and 
offshoring.  What accounts for the 
increasing fragmentation of the pro-
duction process?  What determines the 
form of offshoring?  Does it differ by 
country?  By industry?  What charac-
teristics of the firm or its activities help 
us understand the organizational mode 
it would choose?  
With his co-author Elhanan 
Helpman of Harvard University, 
Grossman has studied some of the 
tradeoffs between outsourcing produc-
tion versus producing in an integrated 
firm.  On the one hand, specialized 
suppliers of inputs can usually produce 
more efficiently, especially if they 
provide those inputs to more than 
one customer.  On the other hand, 
because not every contingency can be 
written into the contract, the supplier 
and the final producer may be subject 
to potential “hold-up” problems.  The 
final producer may end up having to 
pay more than expected for the inputs.  
Or the supplier, after having made 
the relationship-specific investments 
needed to produce the specialized 
input, might find it difficult to get the 
final purchasers to share in the cost 
of those investments.  This creates an 
incentive for underinvestment rela-
tive to what an integrated firm would 
do.  Also, the supplier might do less 
customization of its input so that it 
could sell to other buyers if it has to.  
Once the input has been fully custom-
ized, it’s harder to sell to any other 
buyer, and this puts the input supplier 
in a weak bargaining position relative 
to the buyer.  Thus, the theory predicts 
that there would be a tendency toward 
less firm-specific investment and 
customization in industries with more 
outsourcing.  In industries where these 
types of investment and customization 
are very important to the production 
process, integrated production rather 
than outsourcing would predominate.
Other research suggests that one 
mechanism for getting around the 
potential underinvestment and under-
customization problem between suppli-
er and final producer is cost-sharing for 
the investments.  We often see firms 
providing their suppliers with special-
ized equipment or lending them funds 
to purchase such equipment or raw 
materials.  Cost-sharing on the labor 
side is much less common.  But this 
cost-sharing means that the supplier 
has more bargaining power in any ex 
post renegotiations with the producer.  
This hold-up problem will be worse the 
more capital-intensive the production 
process is.  Hence, this theory predicts 
that we would see more outsourcing in 
industries that are more labor intensive 
and less in industries that are capital 
intensive – and, analogously, more out-
sourcing to countries with abundant 
labor and less outsourcing to countries 
with abundant capital.  This seems to 
fit reality.
Another feature of countries 
that firms would outsource to is what 
Grossman calls thick-market externali-
ties.  A firm is looking for a producer 
to customize its input, so it wants to 
find partners with the proper expertise 
to make what it wants.  This could 
differ from what another producer is 
looking for.  If we think of potential 
suppliers arrayed along a spectrum 
according to their type of expertise, 
finding someone with expertise close 
to what the producer is looking for is 
important.  The denser or thicker the 
market of suppliers, the more likely 
the producer will find one with the 
expertise close to what he is looking 
for.  There is a positive feedback.  If 
more U.S. producers outsource busi-
ness services to India, it will be more 
profitable for Indian firms to develop 
the expertise to provide those services.  
And as more Indian firms enter the 
market and develop the expertise, the 
easier it will be for a U.S. firm to find 
a suitable supplier in India.  On the 
other hand, if no firms are outsourc-
ing to a particular country, then a 
firm might not want to be the first to 
outsource there, since it might not find 
the expertise it is looking for.
Grossman’s research also suggests 
that a country’s legal environment 
is an important determinant of the 
volume of outsourcing the country 
can expect to obtain.  An improved 
contracting environment, all else 
equal, makes the country more attrac-
tive to outsourcers.  However, all else 
is not equal – eventually wages rise as 
the contracting environment im-
proves, and this may lead firms to look 
elsewhere, especially if the original 
motivation for outsourcing was to save 
on labor costs.
Another tradeoff when consider-
ing outsourcing versus integration 
concerns the incentives the firm can 
give to managers for good perfor-
mance.  Since an external supplier has 
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to put up the cost of the inputs and 
the labor for producing the inputs, it 
typically has more at stake than an 
internal manager does, and this would 
provide a better incentive for good 
performance.  On the other hand, it 
is probably easier for a firm to monitor 
the performance of one of its own in-
ternal divisions than an external sup-
plier.  These considerations imply that 
outsourcing will more likely be chosen 
by firms with very high or very low po-
tential productivity and that firms with 
intermediate productivity will choose 
integration.  In addition, for those 
firms that remain integrated, offshor-
ing is chosen most often by the more 
productive of these firms.  A look at 
the data suggests this seems to accord 
well with actual experience.  How-
ever, economists are just beginning to 
empirically test the theories explaining 
firms’ choices of outsourcing versus 
integration and home versus offshore 
production.  According to Grossman, 
this empirical work shows promise, and 
it, along with new theoretical models, 
is helping us understand which types of 
firms in an industry are the ones that 
go offshore or engage in outsourcing, 
which types of industries are prone to 
these types of trade relationships, and 
in which types of countries we should 
expect to see one form of production 
versus another.
EXCHANGE RATES
The Policy Forum’s next session 
looked at implications of exchange 
rate policies and trade deficits on 
the macroeconomy.  Jeremy Siegel 
of the Wharton School, University 
of Pennsylvania, began the session 
emphasizing the demographic com-
ponent of structural trade deficits or 
surpluses across countries, which in 
his view is often neglected.  Over the 
past 50 years, life expectancy has risen 
and retirement age has fallen.  In 1950 
in the U.S., the difference between 
the two was only 1.6 years 
and today it is 14.4 years 
– a large change.  How-
ever, these trends cannot 
continue.  In 1950 in the 
U.S., the number of workers 
per retiree was seven to one.  
Now it is five to one, but it 
is slated to decline to two 
and a half to one by 2050.  
And other countries, in-
cluding Japan, Italy, Spain, 
and Greece, are aging more 
quickly than the U.S.   In 
Japan, the number of work-
ers per retiree approaches 
one to one by 2050, which 
means the workers have to produce 
not only for themselves but also 
transfer goods to the retirees.  These 
trends imply that retirement age has 
to increase.  To investigate the effects 
of these demographic trends, Siegel 
has built an economic model to study 
who in the world is going to produce 
the goods and who is going to buy the 
assets in the economy.  In the model, 
income grows at the rate of productiv-
ity growth until a person retires and 
then it is zero, and consumption grows 
at the rate of productivity growth 
until a person retires and then it is 
flat.  The outcome of the model is the 
equilibrium retirement age, assuming 
that Social Security taxes are fixed.  
The model suggests that by 2050 
the retirement age in the U.S. has to 
increase to 73, which implies that the 
difference between life expectancy and 
retirement age narrows to 9.2 years.  
As Siegel points out, it isn’t merely that 
people have to work longer because 
they are living longer – the retirement 
age has to increase almost twice as fast 
as projected life expectancy.  Things 
are worse if life expectancy rises more 
than the conservative estimates Siegel 
uses in his model simulation. 
What can help solve this “age 
wave” problem?   Faster productivity 
growth can help the situation, but only 
modestly.  That’s because when pro-
ductivity growth accelerates, wages go 
up, and when wages go up, retirement 
benefits go up.  So there’s not much 
help there.  Immigration might help.  
But a half billion immigrants into the 
U.S. over the next 45 years would be 
needed to keep the retirement age in 
the mid 60s; that number is far higher 
than the current U.S. population of 
294 million.  
Siegel says the hope comes from 
the developing world, where 85 percent 
of the world’s population lives and 
where the population is much younger 
Jeremy Siegel
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than the developed countries’.  The 
developing world’s age profile is about 
50 years behind that of the developed 
world – for example, the distribution 
of population by age group in India 
today looks like that of Japan or the 
U.S. in 1950.  The number of workers 
per retiree is projected to decline in 
India but only to four to one by 2050.  
According to Siegel’s model, if the 
developing world can grow at 6 percent 
per year into the future, which is opti-
mistic but not overly so given current 
experience, then the retirement age in 
the U.S. and other developed countries 
can stay roughly where it is today.   If 
growth in the developing world is less, 
then retirement age in the U.S. and 
other developed countries will have 
to rise.  But assuming that growth 
in the developing world is 6 percent, 
then it is the developing countries 
that produce the goods and buy the 
developed world’s assets.  Today, the 
developing countries own less than 
10 percent of the world’s capital, but 
the model simulations suggest that by 
2050, they will own most of the world’s 
capital and they will be producing 
most of its goods.  The model implies 
that the developing countries will be 
running large trade surpluses, while 
the developed countries will be run-
ning increasingly large trade deficits.   
Because most of their populations will 
be retired, the developed countries will 
need to import goods for consump-
tion, and they will sell off the assets 
they have been accumulating for many 
decades.  These trade flows come out 
of the demographics; they are not 
structural imbalances.
What are the implications for 
exchange rates?  In Siegel’s model, the 
trade deficits in the U.S. and the other 
countries of the developed world are 
sustainable at current exchange rates 
– they are driven by the demographics.  
Thus, even though the U.S. trade defi-
cits are very large, they do not cause a 
depreciation of the dollar.  As long as 
foreigners want to acquire U.S. assets 
and Americans want to acquire foreign 
goods, the trade deficits won’t put 
pressure on the dollar exchange rate.  
Given this, Siegel suggests that when 
we are trying to determine whether a 
particular trade deficit is sustainable, 
we shouldn’t use a zero deficit as the 
basis of comparison but the structural 
deficit that will obtain in the long run 
because of large differences in demo-
graphics across countries.
Michael Mussa of the Institute 
for International Economics followed 
Siegel with an opposing view of the 
sustainability of the U.S. current 
account deficit and the path of the 
exchange value of the dollar.  Ac-
knowledging that a wide range of 
outcomes for both exchange rates and 
the deficit have been observed in the 
past, Mussa made a case for why, in his 
view, the dollar remained overvalued.  
In his view, it is difficult for the U.S. to 
borrow against many of its assets on a 
world market.  For example, borrowing 
against our domestic human capital is 
not really feasible.  In the U.S., U.S.-
owned assets abroad used to exceed 
foreign-owned assets in the U.S. by 
about 25 percent of GDP.  Now, it is 
the opposite – foreign-owned assets 
in the U.S. exceed U.S.-owned assets 
abroad by about $2.5 trillion, or 25 
percent of GDP.  Mussa points out that 
no industrial country has ever seen 
that ratio go above about 60 percent of 
GDP, but if nominal GDP growth con-
tinues at about 5 percent and the cur-
rent account deficit remains at about 6 
percent of GDP, net external liabilities 
as a percent of nominal GDP would 
rise to 120 percent of GDP, double 
what any industrial country has been 
able to achieve and sustain.  While it’s 
possible the U.S. could sustain such 
a high level, he thinks it is unlikely.3  
Sustaining a current account deficit of 
2 to 3 percent of GDP over the next 
decade or longer would be feasible in 
Mussa’s view, since there are many 
reasons that foreigners want to invest 
in the U.S. 
What’s needed to bring the 
current account deficit down from 6 
percent of GDP to what, in his view, is 
a more sustainable level?  Mussa cites 
two things: first, a switch in the pat-
tern of world demand toward purchas-
es of U.S.-produced goods and services 
and therefore away from rest-of-world 
goods and services; second, an adjust-
ment in the level of spending relative 
to income both in the U.S. and abroad.   
For the U.S. that means reducing our 
spending; for the rest of the world that 
means increasing their demand relative 
to their income.
Mussa says that both the private 
sector and the government sector in 
the U.S. will need to change their 
behavior to effect these changes.  The 
Because most of their populations will be 
retired, the developed countries will need 
to import goods for consumption, and 
they will sell off the assets they have been 
accumulating for many decades. 
3  In contrast, Jeremy Siegel said in the session’s 
question and answer period that he thinks it is 
quite likely that the U.S. will break the historical 
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years would be a welcome 
development.
Mussa concluded 
with his perspective on 
whether a strong dollar is 
good or bad for the U.S.  
When the dollar is strong, 
the U.S. gets paid high 
prices for the goods and 
services it produces and 
sells abroad, and it pays 
relatively low prices for 
the goods and services it 
purchases from the rest 
of the world.  All else 
equal, that is a good thing.  
But, again, all else is not 
necessarily equal.  If the value of the 
dollar is so high that demand for U.S. 
goods and services by the rest of the 
world falls so that the U.S. doesn’t 
earn enough on what it sells abroad 
to afford what it buys from the rest of 
the world, the U.S. will have to borrow 
more to finance the gap.   And we may 
want the value of the dollar to fall in 
order to restore equilibrium.  As Mussa 
puts it, the goal is to have the strongest 
dollar consistent with maintaining a 
sustainable equilibrium position in our 
external payments position over time.  
In Mussa’s view, that’s a dollar that 
is a fair bit weaker than seen in 2001 
through early 2002, and significantly 
weaker than the current value on a 
trade-weighted basis – perhaps not 
much weaker against the currencies of 
most of the other industrial countries 
but much weaker against the curren-
cies of a number of emerging market 
economies.
Gertrude Tumpel-Gugerell, a 
member of the Executive Board of 
the European Central Bank, brought 
an international perspective to the 
discussion.  She discussed the question 
of whether large swings in exchange 
rates matter for the real economy and 
what the appropriate monetary policy 
response to exchange rate swings is.
The consensus of both academic 
economists and policymakers is that 
exchange rate movements are difficult 
to predict and that random walk mod-
els generally predict as well as standard 
macroeconomic models.  Since ex-
change rates are asset prices, they are 
strongly influenced by expectations, 
which are difficult to measure and to 
include in formal models.  Tumpel-
Gugerell points out the irony, then, 
in the many calls for policy responses 
every time the value of the currency 
moves markedly.  She views this as a 
sign that exchange rate movements are 
seen as important, despite all the dif-
ficulties in understanding them.
The international monetary 
system has generally evolved toward 
greater exchange rate flexibility 
between major currency pairs.  She 
distinguishes several major phases in 
which this evolution has occurred.  
The period of the gold standard was 
one of fixed exchange rates and con-
vertibility of currencies into gold.  It 
ended with the advent of World War I.  
During the interwar periods, coun-
The consensus of both academic economists 
and policymakers is that exchange rate 
movements are difﬁcult to predict and that 
random walk models generally predict as well 
as standard macroeconomic models. 
private sector needs to save more; the 
government needs to put its Social Se-
curity and Medicare budgets in order.  
If the dollar depreciates, it will help 
reduce the drag from lower govern-
ment spending by improving the U.S.’s 
net export position.  If public-sector 
expenditures are not controlled, then if 
the dollar depreciates substantially, in 
Mussa’s view, the Fed will need to raise 
interest rates to curb overly expansion-
ary effects of higher net exports on 
U.S. economic growth.
Mussa believes the rest of the 
world faces a more difficult situation 
than the U.S., since they need to get 
demand up.  In Europe, he looks to 
the European Central Bank to use 
monetary policy as much as it can.  
In Japan, Mussa thinks there is not a 
good deal more that monetary policy 
can do in the short run.  The develop-
ing countries of Asia, which have been 
resisting an exchange rate correction, 
will need to allow that to happen.  In 
Mussa’s view these countries’ massive 
interventions to buy dollars in order to 
keep their currencies from appreciating 
must slow down.  Their purchases of 
U.S. Treasury securities as investment 
need not stop, but Mussa feels that 
$100 billion or $200 billion fewer pur-
chases per year over the next couple of 
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tries went progressively back to the 
gold standard with the goal of restor-
ing fiscal discipline.  But this broke 
down again after the Great Depression 
convinced many that the system was 
faulty, and there was a brief period of 
flexible exchange rates.  The Bretton 
Woods Agreement in 1944 led to all 
the major industrialized countries peg-
ging their currencies to the U.S. dollar.  
This lasted until 1971.  Tumpel-Guger-
ell calls the 1970s the trial-and-error 
system, which led to more flexibility in 
the 1980s and the 1990s, and the cre-
ation of the single European currency.  
She characterizes the current system as 
one of flexible exchange rates among 
major currencies accompanied by 
international cooperation.
Within the current framework, 
how much do exchange rate move-
ments matter for the economy?  Tum-
pel-Gugerell distinguishes between 
effects taking place through the 
price-competitiveness channel and 
those associated with market uncer-
tainty.  Regarding the former channel, 
theory suggests that exchange rate 
movements will have less of an effect 
on closed economies than on small 
open economies.  Research suggests 
that a persistent exchange rate move-
ment can have a significant effect on 
prices and GDP in the euro area, but 
that the effect usually is seen with a 
lag.  For example, firms can squeeze 
their profit margins or can attempt to 
hedge against adverse exchange rate 
movements, thus delaying the effect 
of a persistent move.  The European 
integration process, including the 
introduction of the euro, has reduced 
instability generated by shocks to the 
exchange rate.  In Tumpel-Gugerell’s 
view this reduction in volatility should 
help to boost trade across the countries 
in Europe.
But according to Tumpel-Guger-
ell, the main way to limit undesirable 
exchange rate instability is for poli-
cymakers to focus on achieving and 
maintaining sound macroeconomic 
fundamentals.  She believes that if 
monetary policymakers are committed 
to price stability, this will lead to ex-
change rate stability over the long run.  
Sound and sustainable fiscal policy will 
also play a role in achieving economic 
balance among the world’s economies.
FREE TRADE
I had the pleasure of moderat-
ing our final session, which looked at 
free trade.  For economists, free trade 
is not very controversial – it offers 
participants the benefit of an improved 
standard of living.  But the recent 
negative discourse in the popular press 
has led to a more nuanced discussion 
of the benefits – more documentation 
of those benefits – as well as discussion 
of the dislocations and other costs of 
the transition to free trade.
Timothy Kehoe of the Univer-
sity of Minnesota discussed how free 
trade agreements have affected trade 
and capital flows across 
countries.  There has 
been an expansion of 
regional trade agree-
ments in both Europe 
and the Americas.  The 
U.S. signed a trade 
agreement with Chile 
in 2003, negotiated the 
Central American Free 
Trade Agreement with 
a number of countries, 
and has been in negotia-
tions with several South 
American countries.  
The European Union has 
been expanding as well.  
Kehoe focused his talk on the lessons 
we’ve learned over the past 25 years 
from the economic integration that 
has taken place – from our empirical 
experience with integration and from 
economic models, from where the 
economic models have worked well in 
predicting the effects of integration, 
and from where they have failed and 
need improvement.
Kehoe’s first lesson is that while 
opening up to free trade and invest-
ment may be an important ingredient 
for generating economic growth, it is 
not sufficient.  The Mexican Apertura, 
or opening up of the country, which 
began in the late 1980s and led to the 
North America Free Trade Agree-
ment (NAFTA), had a large impact on 
Mexico, generating large increases in 
foreign trade and investment.  Mexico 
now exports almost twice as much as 
the rest of Latin America combined.  
But while it generated significant 
growth in exports, it did not generate 
much overall economic growth – at 
While opening up to free trade and investment 
may be an important ingredient for generating 
economic growth, it is not sufﬁcient. 
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least not until after the 1994-1995 
crisis there.  
Lesson two is that a free trade 
area such as NAFTA or the Euro-
pean Union is neither necessary nor 
sufficient for generating foreign trade 
and foreign investment.  Chile has just 
negotiated a free trade agreement with 
the U.S.; yet after its economic crisis in 
1981-1982, its exports surged and are 
now about 25 percent of its GDP.  Its 
GDP growth also accelerated sharply, 
and the increase was not only export 
driven.  In contrast, Greece joined 
the European Economic Community 
in 1980, yet its exports as a percent of 
GDP are still under 10 percent, and 
foreign investment in Greece is also 
very small.
Lesson three is that to get foreign 
investment, domestic institutions such 
as banks are important; protections of 
investors’ rights are important; prop-
erty rights – like bankruptcy laws – are 
important.  Although the Mexican 
banking system was opened to foreign 
participation in 1995, it still is not 
functioning well in financing private 
investment, which is still low com-
pared to other countries like Chile.  
Thus, signing a free trade agreement is 
not a guarantee of direct investment.  
Kehoe’s fourth lesson reiterates 
Siegel’s point, namely, that demo-
graphic differences can be important 
determinants of international capital 
flows.  Mexico’s baby boom was much 
stronger than the U.S.’s, and Mexico 
today has many young people.  The 
median age in Mexico is 20 compared 
to 34 in the U.S.  Similarly, the other 
countries in Latin America are young.  
In contrast, the European integra-
tion is between rich, old, and aging 
countries and poor, old, and aging 
countries.  These demographics will 
affect both trade and capital flows 
across countries.
But Kehoe’s fifth lesson is that 
capital flows may be substitutes rather 
than complements of trade flows.  
When we look at the U.S., we see that 
the volume of trade flows between the 
U.S. and our NAFTA partners is much 
higher than between the U.S. and the 
European Union, while the volume of 
investment flows is much higher with 
Europe.  Kehoe posits that this might 
be because the U.S. is afraid of further 
trade restrictions and protectionism if 
trade volumes increase in Europe.
Lesson six is that applied gen-
eral equilibrium economic models of 
NAFTA’s impact did a poor job of 
capturing the very significant increase 
in trade volumes in North America, 
and they did a poor job of identifying 
the sectors in which trade increased.  
For example, if we compare one of 
the best model’s predictions of U.S. 
exports to Mexico in different industry 
sectors over 1988-1999 to the actual 
data on exports, we find a correlation 
of less than 1 percent.  One reason the 
models performed poorly is that they 
were unable to capture a fact shown 
in Kehoe’s research: that much of the 
expansion of trade took place in sec-
tors where there was little or no trade 
before trade liberalization.  Models 
that focus on the exchange rate will 
not capture this new-goods effect; it 
happens with changes in trade policy.
Lesson seven is that dynamic 
applied general equilibrium models 
can do a good job capturing the path 
of capital flows when a country opens 
itself up to foreign investment.  Flows 
of capital into a relatively poor country 
that opens itself to foreign investment 
are accompanied by trade deficits and 
depreciations of the real exchange 
rate.  These inflows eventually stop, 
the trade deficit becomes a surplus, 
and the currency appreciates.  Kehoe 
points out that this happened after 
Spain joined the European Com-
munity in 1986 and capital started 
flowing into the country.  In 1992, 
the process reversed, and while the 
Spanish government was caught off 
guard and called the outflow of capital 
a crisis, this is exactly what the model 
predicted would happen.
Kehoe’s eighth and final lesson 
is that signing a free trade agreement 
does not always mean an increase in 
free trade.  It depends on the level of 
trade barriers and tariffs the country 
operated under to begin with.  In 
Kehoe’s view, Ecuador’s signing a 
free trade agreement with the U.S. is 
a large step toward free trade, since 
there’s a high level of tariffs and trade 
barriers there.  For Latvia and Slove-
nia, joining the European Union will 
give them access to European markets, 
but it will increase the level of tariffs 
under which they currently operate 
and so will be a step away from free 
trade.  Kehoe predicts they will find it 
difficult to import to non-EU coun-
tries.
Douglas Irwin of Dartmouth Col-
lege elaborated on the evolving debate 
over free trade.  He pointed out that 
the first debates over U.S. trade policy 
took place when the new Congress 
met at Congress Hall, just a few steps 
away from the Philadelphia Fed.  James 
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Madison of Virginia introduced the 
first tariff bill on the floor of the U.S. 
House when the first Congress met in 
April 1789.  It passed in July, but only 
after a lively debate.  Indeed, trade 
policy has always been a controversial 
aspect of U.S. economic policy.  Per-
haps the main reason is that trade is 
associated with economic change and 
it affects the distribution of income 
within the country.  This means that 
trade is likely to always elicit various 
opinions.  Irwin points out that the 
same arguments against trade tend to 
recur time and time again and that the 
current complaints that the U.S. can’t 
compete because of low wages abroad, 
that foreign countries are unfair trad-
ers, and that trade will damage the 
economy have all been heard before.  
Nonetheless, the debate on trade has 
shifted over time.  In the 1970s one of 
the issues was that multinationals were 
draining America of capital, invest-
ing in foreign countries rather than 
at home.  In the 1980s, the debate 
focused on Japan and its high-tech 
development.  In the 1990s, NAFTA 
was the issue.  Currently, outsourc-
ing to China and India has moved to 
the forefront.  Irwin’s study of history 
suggests that these issues will pass and, 
by 2010, a new country or issue will 
emerge as the focus of the debate.
When economists are asked if 
trade is good for the U.S. economy, 
the answer is yes.  Despite the disloca-
tions and reallocations that have to be 
borne, the steady march of technol-
ogy and economic adjustments have 
allowed us to reap higher per capita 
income across the decades.  Irwin ac-
knowledges that going through the ad-
justments can be painful, but stopping 
the dislocation and economic change 
would create many more problems.  
And even though fear of trade has 
been constant through our history, the 
U.S. has consistently over the past 30 
or 40 years pursued an agenda of open-
ing up markets and keeping the U.S. 
market open.  Irwin points out that the 
U.S. has done this in two ways.  It has 
negotiated with foreign trade partners 
in the context of the World Trade 
Organization, and it has negotiated a 
number of regional and bilateral trade 
agreements.  There is some debate 
among economists about whether the 
bilateral agreements are better or worse 
than multilateral negotiations, but 
both are proceeding with increased 
momentum.  
This raises the question: if there 
is so much fear of globalization, why 
is it proceeding apace and why have 
markets remained open?  Irwin points 
to three factors that help explain why 
there hasn’t been a great backlash 
against globalization.  First, domestic 
industries that compete with our im-
ports, such as shoes and apparel, have 
been losing their political importance.  
They have shrunk in size or, in some 
cases, have been totally wiped out.  For 
example, in the mid 1960s we import-
ed a third to a half of shoes consumed 
in the U.S.; now we import over 95 
percent.  Also, a number of industries 
that faced foreign competition, such 
as semiconductors and automobiles, 
have gone global.  In the past, they 
have argued for trade protection.  Now, 
they’ve undertaken foreign invest-
ments, have diversified their produc-
tion across many countries, and import 
many goods themselves.  A second 
factor is that many U.S. imports are 
intermediate goods.  Their consumers 
are businesses, not households, and 
they are dependent on getting these 
imports to carry out their own produc-
tion.  Irwin points to two examples: 
Canadian softwood lumber and steel.  
The users of Canadian wood have 
made it much more difficult for the 
U.S. government to give protection to 
domestic producers.  Steel consumers 
put pressure on the Bush administra-
tion against steel tariffs.  A third factor 
that has worked against protectionism 
is the macroeconomic stability the 
U.S. has enjoyed over most of the post-
war period.  Economic growth helps 
ameliorate the pain associated with the 
economic dislocations that accompany 
increased trade and the opening of 
markets.  
Irwin pointed to an example 
that illustrates that protectionism is 
increasingly being viewed as a poor 
policy option.  The state of Indiana has 
considered legislation to ban state con-
tracts going to firms that outsourced 
to other countries.  Not outsourcing 
the processing of state unemployment 
claims would cost the taxpayers of In-
diana $16 million that could otherwise 
be spent on public works such as roads 
or schools, tax cuts, or servicing the 
debt.  This cost has been publicized, 
and this, plus the fact that these jobs 
are not currently in Indiana anyway, 
has led many to question the proposed 
legislation.
In Irwin’s view it will be difficult 
for trade opponents to move the U.S. 
away from its current very low tariff 
position and its open market.  Irwin 
ended his presentation saying he be-
lieves there will always be critics of free 
trade and they will need to be rebutted 
by those who have a stake in and sup-
port the system of open world trade.  
In recent testimony before the Fi-
nance Committee of the U.S. Senate, 
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Chairman Greenspan expressed the 
view that it is essential that we not put 
“our future at risk with a step back into 
protectionism.”4  
How can we ensure that
U.S. markets remain open?  Or, as 
Raghuram Rajan, economic counselor 
and director of research at the Inter-
national Monetary Fund asks, how can 
we build constituencies for free trade?  
First, as was pointed out earlier in the 
day by Kehoe, it’s important to have 
well-functioning institutions and well-
defined property rights to realize the 
benefits of free trade.  Those benefits 
include stronger economic growth.  
But also, over the 20th century, 
countries that have become more open 
for trade have tended to have better 
developed financial markets, which in 
itself helps to foster growth.  This is an 
example of a positive feedback – better 
institutions allow the benefits of free 
trade and free trade allows develop-
ment of better institutions.
Why do such correlations exist 
between openness and financial devel-
opment?  One possibility is that free 
trade strengthens the domestic constit-
uencies for financial sector reform.  For 
example, industries that want to begin 
trading more will need to finance 
that trade and will exert pressure on 
financial markets to develop to meet 
their needs.  Or industries that feel 
the competition from foreigners could 
push for improved financial markets 
to aid them in remaining competi-
tive.  Recent research has shown that 
countries that are more open to trade 
have higher ratios of private-sector 
credit to GDP, and that seems to come 
about because the constituencies that 
are pro-finance become more powerful 
after trade liberalization.
But Rajan argues that the direc-
tion of causality may run the other way 
as well.  The development of financial 
markets may increase the power of 
constituencies in favor of free trade 
relative to those opposed.  Trade lib-
eralization creates winners and losers; 
it does not make everyone uniformly 
better off.  So to understand how 
constituencies in favor of free trade 
are developed, one must identify the 
winners and losers.  Economic theory 
suggests that those who have the 
endowments in which the country is 
rich will be more pro-trade, since those 
who are relatively higher endowed will 
benefit from trade.  For example, the 
U.S has more highly educated people 
than other countries.  So opening up 
U.S. markets to trade will tend to ben-
efit these people, since the U.S. is the 
country that can supply this type of 
worker.  Thus, they are the ones that 
are pro-trade in the U.S.  The low-skill 
workers in the U.S. will be hurt by free 
trade, since other countries can supply 
low-skill workers.  Thus, in the U.S., 
the low-skill workers will tend to be 
against free trade.  In poorer countries, 
where low-skill workers predominate, 
the more highly educated tend to be 
against free trade.
But if free trade is beneficial 
overall, why can’t the winners com-
pensate the losers?  Rajan conjectures 
it is because many of the required side 
payments would need to be enormous, 
and they would have to take place over 
4 See Testimony of Chairman Alan Greenspan 
on China, before the Committee on Finance, 
U.S. Senate, June 23, 2005, www.federalreserve.
gov/boarddocs/testimony/2005/20050623/
default.htm.
such a long period of time that they 
would be hard to commit to.  
If this is the case, then how does a 
country go about changing the politi-
cal balance in favor of free trade?  Ra-
jan sees three broad possibilities.  The 
first is through committing to external 
agreements like those of the World 
Trade Organization or setting a date 
far in the future when the trade and 
capital markets will open up, for ex-
ample, the United Kingdom’s big bang.  
The second possibility is through a 
crisis, as happened in India.  The crisis 
exposes the fact that the country’s 
policy of closed markets creates very 
bad outcomes, or the crisis reduces the 
relative political power of the status 
quo, who are against open markets.  
The third possibility is through build-
ing constituencies.  In developing 
countries this entails showing them 
that there is more opportunity.  The 
more trade that is occurring outside 
a country’s borders, the more its own 
firms want to partake.  Also, when 
the rest of the world is enjoying more 
flows of goods and capital, there can 
be more leakages across a country’s 
borders, and the country may find it 
more advantageous to open itself up 
and control the flows, rather than 
have them go on without any control.  
Consumers also see the benefits of 
free trade in the form of lower prices 
and can create a pro-trade constitu-
ency.  Firms that are more efficient 
are less likely to fear the increased 
competitiveness that comes from open-
ing up markets.  Hence, increasing 
entry into their industry can create 
more efficient firms that then emerge 
as a free-trade constituency.  Similarly, 
individuals may fear free trade because 
they don’t have access to education 
or the resources that will enable them 
to handle the changes that free trade 
will bring.  Creating a safety net for 
these individuals will help shift their 
opinions regarding free trade.
The development of 
ﬁnancial markets may 
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Rajan concluded his presenta-
tion with some data from the World 
Value Survey, a survey of over 150,000 
individuals in 66 countries between 
1981 and 2000, which shows that 
preferences for competition, a proxy for 
free trade, do vary with factors such 
as education, income, age, and type of 
occupation.  It turns out that younger 
people are more against competition 
than older people.  This might reflect 
the fact that younger people tend to 
be producers and fear the job loss and 
older people tend to be consumers and 
value the lower cost of goods.  Those 
with higher wealth, higher social sta-
tus, and higher education tend to favor 
competition.  Unskilled workers are 
more against competition than moder-
ately or higher skilled workers.  An in-
teresting finding is that small business 
owners’ attitudes toward competition 
are influenced by their access to credit, 
while managers’ and employees’ at-
titudes are not.  Small-business owners 
in countries with strong credit markets 
are much more likely to be pro-com-
petition than those in countries with 
weak credit markets.  That is, if they 
have access to resources and feel they 
can get the resources to run their busi-
nesses, they favor competition.  This 
is evidence that institutions matter 
and that financial development and 
well-functioning institutions that allow 
access to resources can foster freer 
trade – the reverse causality mentioned 
earlier.  It also suggests that a country 
that finds itself with dysfunctional 
institutions might find it very hard 
to build support for changing those 
institutions and to build a constituency 
for free trade.  Can an institution like 
the International Monetary Fund help?   
In Rajan’s view the answer is yes, but 
only at the margin.  There needs to be 
momentum within the country itself 
for change.  Large, developed econo-
mies can help develop that internal 
momentum by helping to ensure that 
trade spreads to the poor, developing 
countries.  Freer trade offers outside 
opportunities to the people in those 
countries, who can then develop into 
a constituency within the country in 
favor of even more openness and freer 
trade. 
SUMMARY
The 2004 Policy Forum generated 
lively discussion among the program 
speakers and audience participants on 
a number of the challenges and op-
portunities brought by an increasingly 
global economy.  Our hope is that the 
ideas raised will spur further research 
and foster a greater understanding of 
today’s economy.
We will hold our fifth annual 
Philadelphia Fed Policy Forum, “Fiscal 
Imbalance: Problems, Solutions, and 
Implications,” on Friday, December 2, 
2005. You will find the agenda on page 
35. B R